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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS MADE
DURING DETENTION
The United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Upsbaw v. United
States' stated that a confession is inadmissible if made during illegal detention
due to failure to promptly carry a prisoner before a committing magistrate, re-
gardless of whether the confession is the result of torture, physical or psychological.
The decision is based upon Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5a9 and is in
effect, an amplification of the much discussed McNabb rule,8 presented below
Rule 5a provides that "An officer making an arrest under a warrant. . .or
any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person
without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before
any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses
against the laws of the United States. When a person arrested without a warrant
is brought before a-commissioner or other officer a complaint shall be filed forth-
with." The Notes to the Rules4 state that the reasonable time within which
the prisoner should be brought before a committing magistrate "must be de-
termined in the light of all the facts and circumstances of the case".
The McNabb rule is that confessions are improperly admitted where they
are the plain result of holding and interrogating persons without carrying them
forthwith before a committing magistrate. The McNabb case aroused much com-
ment at the time it was handed down and the dissenting opinion in the Upshaw
case indicates the two extremes that this conflict took by use of the following
language: "Some courts thought that any confession obtained before committ-
ment was inadmissible and some other courts have understood the case to determine
admissibility of confessions by the coercion test".
Following the McNabb case, in Mitchell v. United States,5 it was held that,
notwithstanding an illegal detention of eight days duration, a confession made
"promptly and spontaneously within a few minutes after his arrival at the police
station" was admissible.
The facts in the Upshaw case6 show that Upshaw was arrested about 2:00
o'clock Friday morning and shortly after 9:00 o'clock Saturday morning con-
fessed to the theft for which he had been taken into custody. He was not taken
I Upshaw v. United States, 69 S. Ct. 170 (1948).
2 Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, Rules 5 (a),
IS U.S.C.A. (1946).
3 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943).
4 Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, together with
Notes to the Rules, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Doc. No. 175. (1946).
5 Mitchell v. United States 322 U.S. 65, 64 S. Ct. 896, 88 L. Ed. 114f (1944).
6 Upshaw v. United States supra, and also infra, 168 F. 2d. 167.
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before a committing magistrate until Monday morning. The trial court stated
that without these confessions the prosecution would not have made out its
case. This trial court also sent to the jury the issue of whether or not physical
coercion had been used to secure the confessions, and since the jury found there
was none, this phase of the case was not argued on appeal. The trial court felt
that the detention was not unreasonable as a matter of law, and ruled the con-
fessions admissible over the objections of the counsel for the defendant.
On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals" for the District of Columbia' in
sustaining the lower court decision held that the McNabb case only pointed out
that "coercion without physical brutality may extort a confession, and that an
admission so induced is involuntary. Specifically, it was there held that illegal
detention aggravated by undenied continuous questioning for five or six hours
by half a dozen officers amounted to such invalidating coerion as a matter of
law." The Court said illegal detention standing alone, and without more does
not invalidate a confession unless the detention produced the disclosure and
this was not contended by Upshaw. The Circuit Court was then overruled by the
Supreme Court in holding, as it did, that a confession if made during an illegal
detention due to a failure promptly to carry a prisoner before a committing mag-
istrate is inadmissible.
The view of the Circuit Court in this case is by far the closest to the
Pennsylvania view on the matter. Pennsylvania has held that the mere fact that
a person is under arrest or that he is in charge of armed police officers when
he makes a confession does not make such a confession involuntarys
Furthermore, in Pennsylvania, a confession to a homicide by a boy fourteen
and a half years old was held admissible although it was made to police officers
and obtained late at night after questioning him at great length, "if the con-
fession was not obtained by improper means". 9 In this case the attorneys for
the young defendant took a position very close to the rule announced by the
United States Supreme Court in the McNabb and the Upshaw cases.
One of the more recent cases was that of Commonwealth v. Jones.10 The
Pennsylvania Court here was faced with several of the more usual arguments.
In answering them, the Court stated the law of this state in the following language:
"The mere fact that the defendant was under arrest, or was in
the charge of armed police officers when he made his confession will
not make a confession involuntary. Nor are the statements invalidated
by reason of the fact that appellant was not represented by counsel,
no request for such representation ever having be en made. Similarly
the admissibility of the statements is not affected by the fact that in
7 Upshaw v. United States 168 F. 2d. 167 (1948).
8 Commonwealth'v. Spardute, 278 Pa. 37, 47, 122 A. 161 (1923).
9 Commonwealth v. Cavalier, 284 Pa. 311, 315. 131 A. 229 (1925).
1o Commonwealth v. Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A. 2d. 389 (1941).
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the interrogation appellant was accused of lying or because his guilt
was assumed. And the application of a lie detector did not vitiate the
statements."
In the case of Commonwealth v. Dolan"t the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
considering psychological coercion discussed the problem in the following lan-
guage:
"Marge DeLenko denied that she confessed her guilt. [Of prosti-
tution.] She admitted that she signed the statement but said that she
was so tired that she signed what was put before her to end the question-
ing so that she could go home. Even if so, that will not affect the
admissibilityl2 of her written confession, such testimony, at most will
raise an issue for the jury as to whether her statements in fact were
voluntarily made."
In this Dolan case, the defendants were arrested in a raid on an alleged dis-
orderly house and detained about twenty hours but "were not ill-treated except
for a wearing down process".
Thus it would seem that the question of coercion, by physical means or
by psychological means including detention in Pennsylvania is a question for
the jury to determine if, in fact, the means employed resulted in sufficient
coercion to produce, or was calculated to produce, an untruth."m
The apparent extreme of the Pennsylvania approach to the question of
admissibility of confessions is indicated in the Hipple case.14 Here it was said
that a confession "procured by a trick or artifice not calculated to produce an
untruth is never vitiated thereby".
Where the Commonwealth's witnesses show that a confession is made volun-
tarily without such threat or inducement as might secure a false confession, it
must be admitted. If afterwards the defendant testifies, or produces other wit-
nesses to testify that it was not voluntarily made, it becomes a question for
the jury.1" In Commonwealth v. Weiss1 6 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the weight to be given to the various statements is entirely a matter for the
jury to determine, and then added the provision that they must keep in view
the circumstances that led to the making of the declaration alleged by the de-
fendant to be involuntary. Presumably an unlawful detention for a long period
of time could be such a circumstance but, under the Pennsylvania view, little
more.
11 Commonwealth v. Dolan, 155 Pa. Sup. 453, 459, 38 A. 2d. 497 (1944).
12 Italics are the Court's own.
18 Commonwealth v. Hippie, 353 Pa. 33, 3 A. 2d. 353 (1939).
14 Commonwealth v. Hippie, sapra.
16 Commonwealth v. Jones, irmpra. See also Commonwealth v. Aston, (1910) 227 Pa. 112,
75 A. 1019, wad Commonwealth v. Shaw, 190 Pa. 23, 42 A. 377 (1899).
16 Commonwealth v. Weiss 284 Pa. 105, 111, 130 A. 403 (1925).
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The United States Supreme Court's rule in the McNabb and the Upshaw
cases does not override what has been said about the law of Pennsylvania. The
Supreme Court in the McNabb case, speaking of review of state action said,
"State action expressing its notion of what will best further its own security
in the administration of criminal justice demands appropriate respect for the
deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of its jurisdiction. Such
considerations are wholly irrelevant to the formation and application of proper
standards for the enforcement of the Federal Criminal Law in the Federal Courts.
This court has from the beginning formulated rules of evidence in federal criminal
trials quite apart from constitutional restrictions alone, and in formulating such
rules of evidence.. .the court has been guided by considerations of justice not
limited to the strict canons of evidentiary relevance."
EARL H. PARSONS
